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Preface
Almost 37 billion checks will be written per year 
by 1980 to pay personal, commercial, and gov­
ernmental obligations. During recent years, 
financial institutions have been experimenting 
with and, in many cases, implementing new 
systems designed to reduce the need for “ paper 
based” payments. Through the application of 
computer and communications technologies, 
these institutions are developing systems that 
transfer funds electronically rather than 
physically—electronic funds transfer systems 
(EFTS).
Initially, these new systems were limited 
in terms of the services provided and restricted 
in geographical area and so did not figure 
clearly in the future of electronic banking. 
Today, however, these systems are growing 
rapidly and are impacting far larger numbers 
of consumers and businesses, as the following 
examples illustrate. A large New York bank 
recently installed approximately five hundred 
remote-banking terminals throughout its 
branch network, and an additional 3,500 
terminals in retail stores. In California, a new 
centralized switching network is being installed 
on a cooperative basis by a group of ninety- 
two savings and loan associations to allow the 
transfer of funds between participating mer­
chants’ and customers’ savings accounts. 
Similar networks have been formed in several
other states. And, as a final example, thirty-two 
separate automated clearing houses currently 
are clearing funds transactions electronically 
rather than through the physical movement of 
paper payment instruments.
EFT systems do not employ totally new 
technology, but rather, adapt existing technology 
to provide a new method for exchanges of value. 
This adaptation does not represent a revolu­
tionary, but rather an evolutionary, change in 
auditing requirements or procedures.
These and other current developments as well 
as the potential for changes in the near future 
have led to the development of this paper. The 
computer services executive committee of the 
AICPA requested it to ascertain the state of the art 
in electronic funds transfer systems and to 
determine the impact these systems will have on 
the audits of business entities involved in EFTS.
This guide is divided into four chapters.
The first chapter addresses the nature of EFT 
systems and provides background information 
on EFTS; chapters 2 and 3 cover the current 
status of EFTS in government and the legal 
community, respectively; and the final chapter 
discusses the task force's initial assessment of 
the audit impacts of EFT systems and is 
designed to present comments and suggestions 
for further research and professional 
deliberation.
v
Chapter 1
The Nature of EFTS
A key to any economy’s success is the proper 
functioning of one or more payment systems to 
provide the means for conducting exchanges of 
value. In most modern societies, these involve 
exchanges of goods and services for money.
In recent years, substitutes for money, such 
as checks or other promissory obligations in the
form of credit, have become popular. Travelers’ 
checks, money orders, telegraph transfers, and 
letters of credit all have special characteristics 
as payment mechanisms. The unique char­
acteristics of payment mechanisms and their 
various levels of acceptance impact their use.
Definition
Electronic funds transfer systems are another, 
potentially more complex, payment mechanism. 
Broadly speaking, electronic funds transfer 
systems are payment systems in which the 
processing and communications to effect 
economic exchange, and the processing and 
communications for the production and distribu­
tion of services incidental or related to
economic exchange, are both dependent wholly 
or in large part on the use of electronics. At a 
more technical level, an EFT system can be 
defined as a computer-based network that 
enables payment-system transactions to be 
initiated, approved, executed, and recorded 
with electronic impulses and machine-sensible 
data, rather than with paper.
Impact of EFTS
In most electronic payment systems, the goal 
is to reduce the number of paper-based trans­
actions and thereby reduce the overall cost 
of handling all transactions. This move toward 
electronically based transactions will have 
major impacts on the business community, 
financial institutions, consumers, and, certainly, 
the certified public accountant.
The business community will find that the new 
technology in the payment process will provide 
not only the potential for decreased costs of 
processing but also a potential risk of misappro­
priation of funds through the electronic network.
Industry will likely find a reduction in bad 
debt expense. Certainly, many members of 
the banking community are looking at the new 
electronic payment systems for their potential to 
reduce the float currently provided to checking 
account customers. However, financial institu­
tions will have to consider the significant cost 
to develop the EFT systems.
The consumer is an important link in most 
EFT systems because customer acceptance of 
EFTS is crucial to success. Such acceptance 
can come only through increased awareness 
and an understanding of the potential advan­
tages and disadvantages inherent in such 
systems. Disadvantages center around con­
sumers’ perceived loss of control over the 
payment process and the potential for lost 
privacy with respect to personal financial 
information. EFT does, however, provide several 
advantages: Convenience and lower costs are 
important positive considerations as are the 
reduced need to carry large amounts of cash, 
the elimination of personal bank reconciliations, 
and fewer “ bills" to pay by check each month. 
The consumers’ costs associated with the 
payment process can be reduced with EFT 
systems. Fewer bills mean less postage and 
a potential reduction in checking account 
charges and check printing costs.
Finally, the CPA providing audit services to 
a client who either uses or maintains an elec­
tronic payment system will find significant 
impacts in the nature of auditing procedures 
currently performed within paper-based pay­
ment systems. Often no “visible” audit trail will 
be provided by management to the auditor. 
Tomorrow’s auditor will have to bring new and 
creative auditing techniques and concepts to 
an EFTS environment.
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Types of EFT Systems
Electronic funds transfer systems can be 
grouped into three major functional areas:
•  Remote-banking services
•  Retail point-of-sale services
•  Direct-deposit and preauthorized payment
services
All three types of systems involve computer 
technology to perform part or all of the payment 
and/or funds transfer functions. In both remote­
banking and point-of-sale systems, remote 
computer terminal devices are connected to 
one or more computer systems through a 
leased-line and/or direct-dial telephone com­
munications network. Direct-deposit and pre­
authorized payment systems closely resemble 
traditional batch processing systems with one 
exception: Once the transactions have been 
processed by the originating financial institution, 
they are cleared and settled electronically 
through an automated clearing house (ACH) 
rather than through the traditional paper-based 
clearing house. Each of three types of EFT 
systems is discussed in more detail below.
Remote-Banking Services. These services 
are provided through the use of remote-banking 
terminals or touch-tone telephones. Remote­
banking terminals are called a u to m a te d  te lle r  
m ach in e s  (ATMs), cu s tom er /bank  c o m m u n ica ­
tions te rm ina ls  (CBCTs) or rem ote  se rv ice  un its  
(RSUs). The functions that are normally per­
formed by remote-banking EFT systems can be 
divided into five categories, depending on 
whether the system uses terminal devices 
(terminal systems) or touch-tone telephones 
(automated telephone payment systems).
See table below.
Terminal systems can provide twenty-four- 
hour banking services in a variety of locations. 
The customer inserts a plastic card into the 
terminal and enters data for a specific transac­
tion. Usually, the first piece of data entered is 
a p e rso n a l id e n tif ic a tio n  n um be r (PIN). The 
EFT system uses this number to assure that the 
holder of the plastic card is its authorized user. 
After the PIN number, the customer enters an 
amount and depresses a function key (specify­
ing the type of function to be performed— 
deposit, withdrawal, and so forth).
Once all the appropriate validation proce­
dures for the transaction have been completed, 
the terminal either issues cash (in the case of 
a cash withdrawal) or a receipt (in the case of 
a deposit, transfer, or other function), and then 
returns the plastic card to the customer.
At various points in the transaction, the 
terminal can communicate with a central 
computer system. If the central computer 
services a specific financial institution, the 
system is called a p ro p r ie ta ry  EFT sys tem ; see 
exhibit 1-1 for a graphic illustration. If the central 
computer is a service center that switches 
messages and/or settles accounts for several 
financial institutions, the system is called a 
sw itch  system  (exhibit 1-2). The communica­
tions between the terminal and the central 
computer are usually over a leased-line 
telephone network. In most systems, the com­
munication between the terminal and the central 
computer is scrambled or “encrypted” so that 
anyone trying to tap the telephone network will 
not be able to enter false transactions or obtain 
valid card numbers and their associated PIN 
numbers. In some systems, the terminal is not 
continuously connected to a central computer 
system but operates “off-line” ; at the end of the 
day, it sends the day’s data to the central facility 
via a communications network or other means.
Automated telephone payment system s allow 
the transfer of funds by telephone between a 
customer and a merchant through a financial 
institution. These systems also allow a 
customer to inquire about the status of an 
account with a financial institution. Some 
systems require voice communication with a 
teller; but, in others, the customer uses a touch- 
tone telephone to enter the data necessary to 
accomplish the desired transaction. The account 
number is entered along with the customer’s 
PIN number. Participating merchants in the 
telephone payment system are identified by a 
special number, which is also entered. Finally, 
the amount of the transfer is entered. At several 
points during the transaction, the central com­
puter system communicates with the customer.
Function
Term ina l
System s
A u to m a te d  Telephone  
P aym en t System s
Deposits X
Withdrawals X
Transfers between accounts X X
Bill paying X X
Inquiry on account status X X
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EXHIBIT 1-1
REMOTE BANKING-PROPRIETARY SYSTEM
EXHIBIT 1-2
REMOTE BANKING-SWITCH SYSTEM
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This is done with a vo ice -re spo nse  system , 
which groups prerecorded words into meaning­
ful phrases to confirm to the customer the data 
that has been entered into the system.
Retail Point-of-Sale Services. Retail EFT 
facilitates financial transactions in supermarkets 
and other retail outlets, through the use of 
electronics. Retail EFT services are provided 
through the use of p o in t-o f-sa le  (POS) terminals. 
These POS terminals can vary widely in their 
capabilities. The simplest of these devices 
verify or guarantee checks or perform credit 
card authorizations. The more sophisticated 
units will be used not only to capture sales and 
inventory data but also to transfer funds directly 
from a customer’s account to the merchant’s 
account without the use of paper-based means 
of exchange. (These systems will continue to 
issue a customer’s receipt.) POS services can 
be grouped into three functions:
•  Check verification/guarantee
•  Funds transfer
•  Data capture
Remote banking as described above may also 
take place in a retail environment.
C heck V e rifica tion /G ua ran tee . This service 
(though not truly an EFT service) has been 
implemented in various forms for several years. 
In most early systems, the retail clerk used the 
customer’s driver’s license number and possibly 
one or more other sources of identification to 
verify a check. As check guarantee and check 
verification systems grew, this data was sub­
mitted to a central system by telephone and an 
oral authorization was obtained. In newer 
systems, a plastic card is entered into a POS 
terminal for direct communication with a central 
computer system. The central computer system 
transmits a simple electronic response back to 
the POS terminal, for example, to light a green 
signal of valid authorization or a red signal of 
“not approved.” Some check-guarantee systems 
also transmit to the POS terminal an authoriza­
tion code, which the retail clerk writes on 
the check.
Funds Transfer. Some retail POS systems can 
perform funds-transfer functions similar to 
remote-banking systems. These POS systems 
use a d e b it c a rd  to facilitate the transfer of funds 
from the customer’s account to that of a 
merchant. The debit card, in essence, provides 
for a charge to a depository account (rather 
than extending credit, as c re d it  ca rd s  do). The 
customer presents the debit card to the retail 
clerk, who enters the card into the POS terminal.
On the customer’s side of the terminal is an 
enclosed numeric-key pad, which the customer 
uses to enter the PIN number associated 
with the debit card. At this point, the trans­
action is handled just as it is by the remote­
banking terminal for a funds-transfer trans­
action. The POS terminals are connected 
to the central computer through a leased-line 
telephone network. As with remote-banking 
services, the central computer can be either 
a proprietary EFT system or a switch system. 
Exhibit 1-3 contrasts the present method of 
paying for a purchase using a check with an 
EFT system using a central switch.
Data C apture . Several in-store retail computer 
systems have developed capabilities to enter 
product data through an electronic cash register. 
They capture inventory data as well as pricing 
and discount information. Most of these systems 
use a minicomputer located in the retail store. 
They can provide a natural extension of EFT 
services by incorporating POS terminal func­
tions in existing electronic cash registers.
These systems can use the independent mini­
computer as a communications controller for the 
out-going and in-coming EFT transmissions.
Direct-Deposit and Preauthorized Payment 
Services. Direct-deposit and preauthorized 
payment systems are used to initiate and 
process recurring payments to and from 
customers electronically without manual inter­
vention. These EFT systems, as mentioned 
earlier, closely resemble traditional batch 
processing systems. The difference in'these 
systems results from the substitution of elec­
tronic impulses for paper-payment mechanisms. 
Thus, instead of transporting a batch of paper 
documents to a conventional clearing house, 
electronic data are batched and forwarded to 
au to m a te d  c le a rin g  houses  (ACHs) for clearing 
and electronic settlement. Each system is 
described in more detail below.
D ire c t-D e po s it. A direct-deposit system can 
be defined as a process in which payments are 
made directly to the recipient’s depository 
account at a financial institution.
The direct-deposit process begins when the 
recipient issues a standing authorization to the 
paying organization (“ payer”). Subsequently, as 
payment is due, the payer’s system produces 
a machine-sensible credit, which is then 
forwarded to its financial institution. The payer’s 
financial institution debits the payer’s account, 
posts credits of recipients with accounts in that 
bank, and forwards the remaining credits to a 
clearing house for distribution to the other 
appropriate recipient’s financial institution. The
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EXHIBIT 1-3
PRESENT POINT-OF-SALE CHECK CYCLE
EFT POINT-OF-SALE FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEM 
USING A CENTRAL SWITCH
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EXHIBIT 1-4
PRESENT PAYROLL CYCLE
Check
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process is complete when the recipient’s 
financial institution posts the credit to the 
recipient’s deposit account. Exhibit 1-4 shows 
the present payroll cycle contrasted with the 
direct-deposit cycle.
Preauthorized Payments. A preauthorized 
payment system is a process in which recurring 
payments are paid directly by the payer’s 
financial institution to the recipient’s financial 
institution, without a negotiable paper 
document.
In a preauthorized payment system, the 
payer provides its financial institution with 
written authorization to pay one or more specific 
recurring bills. When the financial institution 
receives a bill, it verifies it using authorization 
master files that contain all the preauthorizations 
currently in effect. After validation and editing 
are complete, the bill payer’s account is 
charged for the amount and a machine-sensible 
credit is generated and forwarded, if neces­
sary, to an ACH for settlement.
A memorandum bill is usually sent to the 
bill payer showing the amount due and the date 
that it will be charged to the account. Various 
regulatory authorities have recommended that 
this notice be mailed one week before payment. 
The bill payer is responsible for ensuring that 
enough funds are available to the account to 
carry out the payment.
If bill payers question the amount of the memo 
bill, they can notify the financial institution to 
prevent any payment until the matter is settled. 
An individual is usually allowed the option to 
terminate participation in the program with 
relatively short notice. A record of payment is 
included in the bill payer's periodic account 
statement, which serves as a receipt.
A preauthorized payment plan, in addition 
to saving time and postage costs, also guar­
antees that the bill payer does not pay late 
charges in the event that the payment goes 
astray.
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Chapter 2
The Current Status of
Government regulation of EFTS can be divided 
into several areas: national bank regulations, 
federal savings and loan regulations and exami­
nation guidelines, and state regulations for 
financial institutions. In addition, the National 
Credit Union Administration has recently 
proposed regulations in this area and Congress 
has been considering a number of bills 
addressing certain consumer issues.1
Current EFTS guidelines for national bank 
examiners are set forth in Banking Circular 
no. 66, issued April 16, 1976.2 The circular 
emphasizes that the guidelines do not represent 
regulations, but merely the “current thinking” 
offered for the consideration of bank examiners 
reviewing EFT systems. The guidelines are 
primarily concerned with consumer safeguards 
and the security and systems integrity of ter­
minal-network operations.
The current guidelines for federal savings 
and loan examiners are found in the Code of
Federal Regulations, 12 C.F.R. 545.4-2, and the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board Office of Exami­
nations and Supervision’s Examination Objec­
tives and Procedures (EOP) Manual, section 
EOP-011. Section 545.4-2 deals primarily with 
consumer issues and physical security of 
remote facilities. The EOP manual sets forth 
guidelines and related review procedures for 
examiners reviewing EFT systems. The guide­
lines are concerned with evaluating the 
operating system and related physical security 
and accounting controls and with the planning 
and development process for the investment in 
the EFT system.
State legislation for EFTS facilities deals 
primarily with consumer protection and with 
competitive balance between federal and state 
chartered financial institutions, between 
large and small financial institutions, and 
between commercial and noncommercial 
banking institutions.
Current Guidelines for National Banks
The primary reference source for EFTS 
guidelines for national banks used in this dis­
cussion is Banking Circular no. 66, issued 
April 16, 1976. In the circular’s cover letter 
addressed to the presidents of all national 
banks, James E. Smith, former comptroller of the 
currency, stated, in part:
These guidelines are by no means regulations, 
nor are they to be interpreted as operating 
standards nor as static and timeless thoughts. 
They are simply representative of our current 
thinking and offered for your consideration as new 
systems are developed or existing systems 
reviewed.
The circular expresses two basic sets of 
concerns. The first represents the concerns 
expressed by consumer advocates, individuals,
and various research groups and deals primarily 
with consumer rights and liabilities in EFTS. The 
second focuses attention on safeguarding the 
security and systems integrity of terminal- 
network operations. The following recommenda­
tions are those presented in the circular.
Consumer Guidelines. The circular dis­
cusses several major consumer guidelines. It 
states that the bank should assure its customers 
that it will use the personal and financial informa­
tion collected by the EFT system only for 
banking purposes. The bank should not sell 
or divulge such information without the cus­
tomers’ written instructions unless it is legally 
required to do so or the situation is within 
accepted banking practices. When a national 
bank uses the services or computer systems
8
1 Also, the Federal Reserve Board has promulgated regulation J, which governs the respective rights and liabilities of 
member banks using the Fed. Wire.
2 EFTS Guidelines, Banking Circular no. 66 (Washington, D.C.: Comptroller of the Currency, 1976).
EFTS  Regulations
of another firm, a contract between the bank and 
such firm should indicate that any information 
compiled by the servicer must be treated with 
the same degree of confidentiality as transac­
tions handled entirely within the bank.
Customers should be provided with the name 
and telephone number of the banking depart­
ment to notify if they lose the card, find a 
statement error, or have complaints. At each 
terminal location, the bank should provide 
customer instructions in the event a transaction 
is denied at the point of sale. This will encourage 
the customer to determine the cause of the 
problem immediately when a transaction is 
denied and will reduce the potential for mistakes 
or adverse customer reaction. No account 
balance, specific overdraft information, or 
similar specific dollar amount information 
should be transmitted to a remote terminal 
operator other than a duly authorized bank 
employee or the customer. However, adminis­
trative information such as customer identifica­
tion and instructions should be permitted.
Customers should be notified seven calendar 
days before processing any preauthorized debit 
transactions. This guideline allows the customer 
time to stop payment on otherwise preauthor­
ized transactions.
The circular states that banks should develop 
reasonable procedures to prevent unauthorized 
withdrawals from customer accounts. Liability 
for such losses should be clearly stated in the 
contractual relationship between the bank and 
the customer. Although the circular states that 
the bank will bear the liability for such losses 
except in cases of customer fraud or negligence, 
federal law limits the liability of credit card 
holders to $50 regardless of whether or not the 
cardholder has been negligent.3
Card transactions should provide for 
adequate customer identification and authen­
tication. The circular uses the example of 
personal identification numbers as an accept­
able technique. Such a system should avoid use 
of numbers such as social security numbers or 
birth dates. The customer should be cautioned 
against writing the identification number on the 
card itself or giving it verbally to a terminal 
operator.
Security Guidelines. The circular discusses 
several important security guidelines. It recom­
mends protection of data transmissions between 
terminals and the computer facility from external 
threats such as tapping, surveillance, and 
message insertion by security techniques such 
as message encryption.
Terminal and operator authentication codes 
should be used. If a retail electronic cash 
register is used as a terminal, the contract with 
the retailer should stipulate that an adequate 
audit trail will exist and that transactions can be 
adequately identified through an audit or edit 
routine within the retailer’s system.
The circular has several guidelines regarding 
physical control over the use of personal iden­
tification numbers. They are primarily concerned 
with preventing unauthorized association of the 
identification number with the customer account 
number. Accordingly, the circular enumerates 
specific procedures, including retention cycles 
for tapes and print-outs used in the encoding 
of identification and account numbers, physical 
controls over the supply of blank cards and 
encoding equipment, and suggested proce­
dures and policies for mailing and physical 
distribution of cards.
Automated teller machines that operate in an 
off-line mode should have files adequate to 
accommodate the “ bad card” identification 
information for a period of two years or a period 
that reasonably exceeds the card expiration/ 
reissue cycle, whichever is shorter. These files 
should be updated daily. The circular recom­
mends conversion of off-line terminals to 
on-line as soon as is economically and opera­
tionally feasible.
Although specific guidelines are not set forth, 
the circular recommends that the physical 
controls over the computer room be at least as 
stringent as those provided for the terminal 
network. Segregation of functions should be 
enforced, and the systems should be fully 
documented and audited.
When a bank contemplates installation and 
operation of a banking facility in a non-bank 
commercial establishment, whether operated 
by the merchant or bank personnel, bank 
management should review the security devices 
and procedures in effect in the location before 
installation. Even though retail POS devices 
are not covered by the Bank Protection Act, the 
availability and accessibility of an alarm system 
should be considered. In case a POS system 
fails, the merchant should be aware of the 
backup procedures, applicable credit limits, 
and provisions for restoring service.
Although the circular does not discuss 
specific guidelines to detect fraud or criminal 
abuse, sufficient controls should be established 
over data flow in a multibank switching environ­
ment. The circular identifies message encryption 
as a recognized technique for this purpose; 
however, alternative techniques may become
3 Note that federal law deals solely with individual consumers, rather than corporate users of EFTS.
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available as a result of technological or systems 
innovation.
The bank should review its Bankers Blanket 
Bond coverage with its insurance carrier to 
determine whether and to what extent EFT 
systems are covered. Bank management and the 
board of directors should be fully aware of the 
potential liability assumed by the bank if it 
elects to self-insure.
Supervisory Action. The circular states that 
the examining staff of the office of the comp­
troller of the currency (OCC) will review bank- 
customer agreements and the underlying rights 
and liabilities of all parties in such contractual 
arrangements. Furthermore, security safeguards 
and operator procedures for terminal-network 
EFT systems will be reviewed in the same 
manner as other operating systems. The OCC 
will initiate corrective action where the examin­
ing staff detects consumer abuse of the system 
or imprudent procedures by the bank.
Current Emphasis of OCC. In two separate 
speeches in October and November of 1976, 
an official of the OCC emphasized current areas 
of concern over the control and planning func­
tions of EFT systems. The OCC indicated that
the circular was issued primarily in response 
to numerous requests for such guidelines from 
banks interested in developing EFT systems and 
to provide guidance in the development and 
improvement of EFT systems without the 
negative effects of additional regulations.
Major concerns of the OCC in EFT develop­
ment are consumer acceptance and controls to 
protect consumers from fraud and abuse. The 
OCC official emphasized controls over custody 
and distribution of cards to prevent counter­
feiting and unauthorized association of personal 
identification numbers with account numbers. 
Controls mentioned included dual control over 
the supply of cards, separate mailing of per­
sonal identification numbers and related cards, 
and encryption of identification numbers on 
plastic cards.
Also of major concern are the physical 
controls over computer hardware and software 
to detect and prevent unauthorized access to 
information or disruption due to sabotage or 
catastrophe. Controls in this area included 
encryption of messages from terminals to CPU, 
backup hardware facilities (including disaster 
plans), and adequate insurance coverage of 
EFTS transactions.
Current Guidelines for Federal Savings 
and Loan Associations
To date, federally chartered savings and loan 
associations have operated EFTS units as pilot 
projects under the authority of temporary 
regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board (FHLBB). The FHLBB’s official position 
regarding EFT systems has been set forth in the 
following:
•  Code of Federal Regulations (the temporary 
EFTS regulations), section 545.4-2.
•  The FHLBB office of examinations and 
supervision’s Examination Objectives and 
Procedures Manual, section EOP-011.
In addition, part 563a of the C.F.R. insurance 
regulations, which deals with physical security 
in savings and loan offices, is incorporated by 
reference in section 545.4-2. A permanent 
regulation has replaced the temporary provi­
sions of section 545.4-2 as of July 1, 1978. 
Certain of its provisions differ from those of the 
temporary EFTS regulation.
Section 545.4-2. The board’s EFTS regulation, 
in both its temporary and permanent forms,
authorizes the use of remote-banking terminals 
and describes minimum standards for physical 
security of these facilities. It also authorizes the 
FHLBB to require a financial institution to 
provide EFT services to other financial institu­
tions under certain conditions. Although the 
FHLBB does not consider remote terminals 
to be branches or satellite facilities, as a matter 
of policy it has not permitted federally chartered 
financial institutions to establish facilities on 
an interstate basis. In addition, the FHLBB 
position on the “ branch” issue is currently 
being litigated.
The physical controls over remote terminals 
are incorporated by reference to section 563a 
of the insurance regulations. Minimum physical 
security standards are presented in an appendix 
to section 563a and provide specific guidelines 
for the weight of the unit, thickness of the 
exterior walls of the unit, and tensile strength 
of the steel used in the unit. According to the 
section, the terminal “should also be designed 
so as to be protected against actuation by 
unauthorized persons, should be protected by
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a burglar alarm, and should be located in a 
well-lighted area.”
EOP-011. This section of the EOP manual 
provides guidance to examiners reviewing EFT 
systems. The guidelines are primarily concerned 
with two phases of EFT systems:
•  The propriety and reasonableness of the 
development process and investment in the 
system.
•  The functional system and related physical 
security and accounting and control proce­
dures.
The guidelines describe several considerations 
for the evaluation of an association’s operating 
policies and practices:
•  A feasibility and marketing study should be 
performed. Such a study should include a 
cost/benefit analysis, which should be 
updated on an on-going basis.
•  The integrity, business history, and financial 
stability of hardware and software suppliers 
should be investigated.
•  Safeguards should be built into the system 
to protect against over-withdrawals, provide 
adequate security over personal identification 
numbers, protect the main EDP system from 
penetration by taps into communication lines, 
and provide physically safe operating 
conditions for users and servicers of remote 
terminals.
•  Written customer agreements outlining the 
terms of plastic card use, liability for un­
authorized use, and conditions under which 
account information may be released to third 
parties should be developed.4
•  Internal and procedural controls should be 
sufficient to provide an audit trail for transac­
tions processed through the EFT system.
The guidelines also list examination objec­
tives and procedures that are designed primarily 
to ensure that EFT systems follow FHLBB 
policies and regulations. Such procedures rely 
largely on the individual examiner’s experience 
and judgment to evaluate the adequacy of the 
procedures and controls of the EFT system.
Recent Emphasis of FHLBB. As indicated 
above, on July 1, 1978, a permanent EFTS 
regulation has replaced the temporary provisions 
of section 545.4-2. The new regulation will 
include consumer protection provisions, clarify 
application procedures, and require federally 
chartered associations to take reasonable 
measures to secure adequate bonding and 
security. Both the temporary and permanent 
EFTS regulations contain a number of conditions 
for approving individual applications to operate 
remote terminals. However, as a matter of policy, 
the board will not approve an application for 
a remote terminal unless—
before the applicant begins to operate its 
remote service unit system, it [has], to the satis­
faction of the Board’s staff, fulfilled] the following 
requirements:
(1) Designed] the remote service unit system 
to provide for on-line real-time operation
at all times that the remote service units at 
the merchant locations are operational, or 
otherwise provide[d] that financial transactions 
at a remote service unit result in instantaneous 
debits and credits to all affected accounts at 
the time the transaction occurs.
(2) Design[ed] a settlement procedure with the 
merchants so that at no time will a merchant 
be the recipient of funds from the applicant 
which constitutes unsecured lending; and
(3) Submit[ted] executed copies of all agree­
ments between the applicant and each of the 
respective merchants concerning the remote 
service units.
Current Legislation for State Financial 
Institutions
The primary reference source used in this 
discussion of current legislation for state banks 
is a summary developed by the director for 
education and research of the Conference of 
State Bank Supervisors. The summary was 
issued in April, 1976, but the information con­
tained in it is still reasonably accurate.
It appears that there is no uniform approach to 
EFTS legislation by the various states. The states 
take different positions with respect to such 
issues as (1) whether all or certain EFTS units 
are branches and subject to state restrictions on 
branching, (2) whether EFTS units may be 
manned by nonbank personnel, (3) whether all
4 Effective July 1, 1978, this will be part of section 545.4-2, as well as the guidelines.
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institutions must be allowed to share remote­
banking terminals, and (4) whether additional 
regulation is required to protect the consumer.
Thirty-two states (as of May, 1978) have en­
acted legislation or have had regulatory inter­
pretations that (1) allow electronic off-premise 
facilities and (2) do not consider such facilities 
branch banks. Of these thirty-two states, 
nineteen require some form of mandatory 
sharing of such facilities under specified condi­
tions, eight states permit sharing facilities but 
do not require it, and five do not mention the 
sharing issue.5
Of the remaining eighteen states, seventeen 
view electronic off-premise facilities as branch 
banks under existing statute. One state, Nevada, 
has not taken any statutory or regulatory action 
regarding such facilities.
A review of examples of specific EFT 
legislation enacted by several states indicates 
some of the legislators’ concerns: (1) enabling
legislation for EFT systems for state chartered 
financial institutions allows such institutions to 
remain competitive with federally chartered 
financial institutions located within the state and 
with financial institutions in other states that 
allow EFT systems; (2) EFTS legislation can 
affect the competitive balance between com­
mercial and noncommercial financial institu­
tions; (3) the consumer’s liability for fraud, 
theft, or unauthorized use of cards should have 
specific limits; (4) information gathered by EFT 
systems should be protected to the same degree 
of confidentiality as transactions handled 
entirely within the financial institution; (5) the 
competitive balance between large and small 
financial institutions should be maintained by 
allowing smaller institutions to share the EFT 
facilities of larger institutions, or by removing 
geographical limitations and/or capital 
requirements which otherwise apply to 
branches.
Summary
EFTS regulations enacted to date principally 
address consumer safeguards, competition 
among financial institutions, and system
security and control. Most jurisdictions require 
regulatory approval for remote-banking 
terminals.
5 Analysis of Enacted EFTS State Legislation (Washington, D.C.: American Bankers Association, May 1978).
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Chapter 3
EFTS and the Legal 
Environment
Currently, several major legal issues involving 
EFTS remain to be resolved. These issues are 
being addressed by the courts, various regula­
tory authorities, and individual state legislatures. 
Overlapping responsibilities, and in some 
instances, conflicting decisions have con­
tributed to the uncertainty. At the same time, the 
development of EFT systems has continued.
Congress realized that large EFT systems 
were in development and was aware of the 
potential problems; it, therefore, established 
the National Commission on Electronic Fund 
Transfers (NCEFT). The purpose of this com­
mission was to develop recommendations for
legislative action that would resolve the 
confusion and provide for consumer protection. 
On March 7, 1977, the commission published 
its preliminary recommendations and on 
October 28, 1977, it issued its final report.
The NCEFT recommendations will have a 
significant impact on action taken by Congress 
as well as by other legal and regulatory 
authorities.
In this chapter, three of the major legal 
issues are discussed. Each has a brief explana­
tion, followed by some of the related court 
cases and the recommendations of the 
NCEFT.
Are Remote-Banking Terminals Branches?
This issue is most significant in states that 
either (1) have more liberal branching provisions 
for one type of financial institution than for other 
institutions or (2) limit bank branching. The 
more liberal the branching laws, the less 
significant this issue. Consider a state, for 
example, which limits the number or the 
locations of a financial institution’s branches 
(or which requires a high level of capital for each 
branch). If a remote-banking terminal is deemed 
not to be a branch, the financial institution may 
place terminals throughout the state, thus 
expanding their market area free of those 
restrictions or requirements.6
One aspect of the branching issue concerns 
the types of transactions terminals may handle 
without being considered branches. In several 
unit-banking states, a terminal can dispense 
cash, transfer money, and provide account 
balance information. However, the terminals are 
not permitted to accept deposits. Until recently,
the comptroller had taken the position that remote 
banking terminals were not branches, but, in 
the cases described below, his position was 
challenged and ultimately rejected.
Terminals authorized by the FHLBB may 
perform deposit services, withdrawals, and 
transfers between accounts but may not be used 
to open new accounts. The regulations govern­
ing the terminals expressly state that the 
terminals are not to be deemed branches. As 
indicated below, this issue is being litigated. 
An additional issue exists with respect to federal 
savings and loan associations—namely, 
whether state EFTS legislation can supersede or 
supplement the FHLBB regulations.
The court cases to date have been primarily 
in unit-banking states and have primarily 
involved a challenge to the comptroller’s 
definition of “ branch” under the McFadden Act.7 
The McFadden Act applies only to commercial 
banks; thus, savings and loan associations and
6 If a remote-banking terminal established by a national bank is deemed a branch, the comptroller must, under the McFadden 
Act, impose the same requirements for the establishment of the terminal as the state in which the financial institution 
is located imposes on its state chartered institutions.
7 The McFadden Act is an amendment to the National Bank Act that describes a “branch" as including any additional 
office or branch or place of business where deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent.
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credit unions have had little legal restriction, 
at the federal level, on their remote terminals.
Related Court Cases. In In d e p e n d e n t B ankers  
A sso c ia tio n  o f A m e rica  (IBAA) v. Jam es E. 
Sm ith, C o m p tro lle r o f the C urrency  (No. 75-0089, 
D.D.C. (Oct. 10, 1975)), the court of appeals 
upheld the district court's ban on remote­
banking terminals. The comptroller was ordered 
to rescind a ruling that remote terminals were 
not branches and to consider them as branches 
subject under the McFadden Act to state 
branching restrictions. Other courts reached 
similar decisions, such as in State o f M isso u ri 
v. First N a tio n a l B ank o f St. Lou is  (No. 75-113, 
D. Mo. (Nov. 18, 1975)), and State o f Ill in o is  v. 
C on tinen ta l N a tio n a l B ank a n d  State o f I llin o is  v. 
F irs t N a tio n a l B ank o f C h ica g o  (409 F. Supp. 
1167, N. D. III. (Dec. 10, 1975)).
In an Oklahoma case decided on December 
23, 1975, however, the court upheld the comp­
troller of the currency’s interpretive ruling that 
the terminals are not branches and thus can 
be deployed remotely and offer a full line of 
services including deposits.
On October 4, 1976, the Supreme Court 
refused to hear an appeal of In d e p e n d e n t 
Bankers A sso c ia tio n  v. Jam es E. Sm ith, 
C o m p tro lle r o f  the C urrency ; State o f Ill in o is  v. 
C on tine n ta l N a tio n a l Bank, and State o f Illin o is  
v. F irst N a tio n a l Bank o f C h icago , thereby 
permitting the lower court decisions to remain in 
place. The Illinois banks and eventually the 
First National Bank of St. Louis were required 
to discontinue use of their remote-banking 
terminals.
The FHLBB’s regulations were challenged in 
B lo o m fie ld  F edera l S av ings a n d  Loan A ss o c ia ­
tion  v. A m e rica n  C om m un ity  S tores C orp.,
396 F. Supp. 384 (D. Neb. 1975). In this case,
a federal savings and loan association sued 
a retail store, the FFILBB, and the board mem­
bers, challenging the validity of the FHLBB’s 
temporary regulation governing remote-banking 
terminals. The plaintiffs contended that the 
board had exceeded its statutory authority in 
promulgating the regulation, and that the board 
did not obey its own office-location regulations 
in authorizing remote terminals. The Nebraska 
federal district court upheld the FHLBB, finding 
that its statutory authority was broad enough 
to encompass issuance of the regulations 
and that the office-location rules only applied to 
savings and loan branches, and, by the court’s 
interpretation of previous regulations as well as 
according to the temporary regulation, remote­
banking terminals are not branch offices.
The regulations have also been challenged in 
In d e p e n d e n t B ankers  A sso c ia tio n  o f A m erica  
v. Federa l H om e Loan B ank B oard , No. 76-0105 
(D.D.C., filed Jan. 19, 1976). The case is still 
pending.
Recommendations of the NCEFT. The
NCEFT recommends allowing depository institu­
tions to deploy their terminals for all typical 
banking transactions, including the acceptance 
of deposits, anywhere within a state. In addition, 
the terminals could also be deployed and 
provide the same services to contiguous states 
within the depository institution’s natural 
market area.
Nondepository institutions, such as retailers 
and supermarkets who allow their customers to 
use terminals to communicate with depository 
institutions, should not be considered to be 
regulated depository institutions. Thus, they 
would not fall under the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Reserve Board, comptroller of the 
currency or other regulatory body.
What Are the Antitrust Implications of 
Shared EFT Networks and Terminals?
In many cases, remote-banking terminals and 
merchant point-of-sale terminals have been 
deployed on a shared basis. Essentially, there 
are two types of shared networks. In one case, 
a single financial institution develops the system 
and makes it available to other financial 
institutions for a "per transaction” fee. Another 
approach has been the joint development and 
operation by a group of financial institutions. 
Both approaches have caused some concern 
about the impact of a small number of shared 
EFT networks versus a larger number of com­
peting networks. The major concern is that large
shared or cooperative networks may not provide 
sufficient competition to ensure high quality 
services and the lowest possible prices to the 
consumer and merchant. An additional concern 
is that large financial institutions will establish 
EFT networks and not allow smaller institutions 
to join, thus diminishing their ability to compete.
Related Court Cases. Most of the legal 
activity concerning mandatory sharing has 
occurred within state legislatures and the 
Justice Department. The American Bankers 
Association noted in A n a lys is  o f E n ac ted  EFTS
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State L e g is la tio n  that nineteen states have some 
form of mandatory sharing legislation.8
The Justice Department has urged both the 
Federal Reserve Board and the FHLBB to 
minimize their efforts in the area of POS to 
encourage competition among the financial 
institutions.
On March 7, 1977, the Justice Department 
outlined its antitrust objections to the Nebraska 
Electronic Transfer System (NETS). The 
primary objections were:
1. As of October, 1977, NETS membership 
represented 86 percent of all commercial 
deposits, and it was expected to approach 
100 percent. The Justice Department’s 
available evidence did not support the 
necessity of an all-encompassing joint 
venture.
2. The system was designed to retard individual 
member initiative by requiring that all 
services be designed collectively and that 
terminals bear no corporate identification of 
the installer.
3. All commercial banks were allowed to join 
and were required to share terminals; 
however, savings and loan associations and 
credit unions were precluded from 
participating.
The NETS board stated that they intended 
to continue the program and will determine how 
to comply.
Recommendations of the NCEFT. According 
to the NCEFT, shared EFT systems should be 
established on a pro-competitive basis that 
provides free choice within federal antitrust 
laws. Decisions whether or not the network is 
pro-competitive should be made individually, 
based upon—
1. The feasibility and likelihood that two or more 
competing networks could be developed in 
the same area.
2. The effect on actual or potential competition 
in the market.
How Will Consumer Privacy Be Protected?
The privacy of the individual is becoming an 
increasingly important issue. The major concern 
is unauthorized storage of and access to per­
sonal data gathered by banks, insurance 
companies, credit bureaus, government, and 
other institutions. Problems relate to the 
unauthorized access to data, provision of 
incorrect o r out-of-date information, and the 
unauthorized sale of name lists and other 
personal data. The advent of EFT systems and 
expanded technological capabilities provide 
the potential for even greater problems. EFT 
systems will be able to capture most of an 
individual’s financial transactions at the place 
and time they occur. Expanded technological 
capabilities will make possible the storage and 
rapid retrieval of this massive amount of data.
Related Court Cases. In the case of C a lifo rn ia  
Bankers A sso c ia tio n  v. S hu ltz  (416 U.S. 21, 39 
(1974)), the Supreme Court upheld the con­
stitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act and found 
that the act’s recordkeeping provisions did not 
violate the individual’s Fourth and Fifth Amend­
ment rights. The Bank Secrecy Act requires 
substantial collection, storage, and reporting of 
individual financial data by financial institutions.
The law was enacted to enable law enforcement 
agencies to summon the individual's financial 
information without notifying the subject of 
the inquiry.
In the case of U n ite d  States v. M ille r  (425 
U.S. 435 (1976)), the Supreme Court denied that 
an individual has a constitutionally protected 
interest in transaction information maintained by 
his depository institution, holding that the 
information was freely given and that it is the 
property of the financial institution.
Recommendations of the NCEFT. The
NCEFT recommends enacting federal legislation 
to grant individuals the right to contest any 
government access to their financial informa­
tion, and to provide prior notification to indi­
viduals of any subpoena or summons to access 
information. This legislation should consider 
law enforcement and other government 
requirements.
Additional legislation should be enacted to 
prevent third-party private sector use of informa­
tion concerning a consumer’s depository 
account without specific consent except for the 
information necessary to verify or complete a 
transaction.
8 Analysis of Enacted EFTS State Legislation (Washington, D.C.: American Bankers Association, May 1978).
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Who W ill Be Liable for EFTS Errors 
or Irregularities?
Under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), 
which covers paper-based payment systems, 
there are specific rules governing the liability 
of the bank or consumer in the event of an error, 
irregularity, or fraud. The consumer assumes no 
liability for fraudulent checks, for example, 
unless there is proof of negligence and the 
negligence substantially contributed to the loss.
The UCC’s application to the new electronic 
payment systems is unclear at best. As a 
result, the rights and liabilities of the respective 
parties of an EFTS transaction are unresolved 
in the absence of specific contractual agree­
ment. In many instances, contracts between the 
providers and users of EFT services either 
absolve the provider of all liability or fail to 
address the issue at all. On the individual con­
sumer level, however, existing or pending 
legislation allocates primary responsibility (and 
liability) for errors or irregularities to the financial 
institution providing the EFT service. The 1970 
amendments to the Truth in Lending Act limited 
the consumer’s liability on credit cards to $50. 
Although those provisions do not cover debit 
cards, pending legislation would extend them to 
debit cards.
Recommendations of the NCEFT. The
NCEFT recommends that the depository 
institution should be liable for erroneous, 
unauthorized, or fraudulent use of an account 
unless the depository institution can demon­
strate its use of reasonable care and that 
consumer negligence or fraud substantially 
contributed to the act.
The consumer who reports to the depository 
institution the loss of a card, compromise of an 
identification code, or unauthorized use, shall 
not be liable for unauthorized transactions from 
the same source occurring thereafter but may 
be liable without any ceiling for losses occurring 
before notification. The consumer has the 
responsibility to examine statements and to 
report errors or irregularities to the depository 
institution within a reasonable amount of time. 
Failure to report would make the consumer bear 
the loss if the depository institution had acted 
with due care. Contrary to the NCEFT’s 
recommendation, the pending legislation would 
limit the consumer’s liability to $50 for un­
authorized transactions occurring before or after 
his notification to the depository institution.
Summary
Several legal issues related to electronic funds 
transfer systems have not been completely 
resolved. However, NCEFT recommendations 
will provide at least the starting point from 
which consistent legislation can be developed.
The Justice Department and NCEFT emphasis 
on competition should insure that consumer 
acceptance or rejection will have a significant 
impact on the eventual design of the EFT 
products and their pricing.
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Chapter 4
Internal Control Considerations 
in EFT Systems
The Extent of the C lient’s System
EFTS can connect many different organizations 
into one vast system. The auditor of each 
organization must consider what portions of 
EFT systems are a part of his client’s system 
of internal accounting controls. Statement on 
Auditing Standards no. 3, paragraph 24, defines 
the extent of the client’s system of internal 
control and auditor’s review of that system as 
follows:
An auditor’s review of the client’s system of 
accounting control should encompass all sig­
nificant and relevant manual, mechanical, and 
EDP activities and the interrelationship between 
EDP and user departments. The review should 
comprehend both the control procedures related 
to transactions from origination or source to 
recording in the accounting records and the 
control procedures related to recorded account­
ability for assets.9
SAS no. 3 also states that “the preliminary 
phase of an auditor’s review should be designed 
to provide an understanding of the flow of 
transactions through the accounting 
system. . . .” 10 The problem in EFT systems is 
determining where the “flow of transactions” 
for a particular organization starts and stops. 
SAS no. 1 states that—
Transactions include exchange of assets or 
services with parties outside the business entity 
and transfers or use of assets or services within 
it. The primary functions involved in the flow of 
transactions and related assets include authoriza­
tion, execution, and recording of transactions 
and the accountability for resulting assets.11
In EFT systems, the point at which authoriza­
tion for the transaction occurs and assets or 
services are exchanged will determine the outer
boundary of the client’s flow of transactions. 
Therefore, the client’s system would encompass 
all aspects of the system from the point of 
origination through recording in the books of 
account (including, if applicable, notification 
to the customer by statement or other means). 
This extent may vary based on the types of 
transactions processed by the EFT system.
The following discussion will address the 
potential impact on the extent of the client’s 
system of internal control of each of the 
following categories of the EFT systems and 
their related transactions: remote-banking 
services, retail point-of-sale services, and 
direct-deposit/preauthorized payment services.
Remote-Banking Services. The most 
prevalent transactions in remote-banking EFT 
systems are deposits and withdrawals. In both 
cases, an exchange of assets occurs at the 
terminal. Because this exchange occurs at the 
terminal itself, all portions of the EFT system 
linking the terminal to the financial institution’s 
computer would be considered part of the 
financial institution’s overall system. Both bill 
payment transactions and transfers between 
accounts represent some combination of a 
deposit and withdrawal and therefore are 
accounting transactions that originate at the 
remote-banking terminal.
Remote-banking terminals do, in some 
cases, provide for customer inquiry about 
account status and/or balance. Technically, 
such activity is not an accounting transaction 
because it does not involve an exchange of 
assets or services. However, inquiries do 
represent a potential exposure to the financial 
institution because of possible misuse of the 
information obtained by such inquiries.
9 The Effects of EDP on the Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control, SAS no. 3, in Professional Standards, vol. 1, 
AU sec. 321.24 (New York: AICPA, 1975).
10 Ibid, AU sec. 321.25.
11 The Auditor’s Study and Evaluation of Internal Control, SAS no. 1, in Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 320.20 (New 
York: AICPA, 1974).
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Retail Point-of-Sale Services. As mentioned 
earlier, retail POS services include check 
verification, check guarantee, and funds transfer 
for purchases and returns. Check verification 
activities are not accounting transactions 
between the customer and the financial institu­
tion because no exchange of assets or services 
occurs. Such activity is, in essence, an inquiry 
to some portion of an EFT system. The check 
guarantee process may or may not result in an 
accounting transaction. Those guarantee 
functions that do not encumber a customer’s 
account for the amount of the check are 
inquiries, not accounting transactions between 
the customer and the financial institution. 
However, those POS systems that interact 
directly with a financial institution to encumber 
or place a hold on the customer’s account for 
the amount of the check would, in fact, result 
in an accounting transaction. In theory, such 
transactions represent the transfer of funds 
between a customer’s account and the financial 
institution’s holding account. In such systems, 
the financial institution has covered its future 
liability to pay the paper instrument by assuring 
that funds available at the time of the guarantee 
are not subsequently withdrawn, transferred by 
the customer, or used for other purposes.
In either the check verification or check 
guarantee process, the agreement between the 
POS merchant and one or more other par­
ticipants in the EFT system may require a fee 
for the process of check verification or guar­
antee. The extent of the financial institution’s 
accounting system for these fee transactions 
would depend on the portions of the EFT system 
involved in generating both the revenue and 
receivable portions of the transaction.
Retail POS systems also allow direct funds 
transfer for the purchase and/or return of goods. 
Funds transfers are accounting transactions 
because they too involve an exchange of assets 
or services. These transactions differ slightly 
from those previously discussed in that more 
than one transaction within the EFT system is 
involved. For example, a purchase would 
generally involve three separate transactions:
•  A transaction between the customer and his 
or her financial institution to remove payment 
funds from a depository account.
•  A transaction between the merchant and the 
customer involving the receipt of goods or 
services for the corresponding payment.
•  A transaction between the merchant and the 
merchant’s financial institution for the deposit 
of the funds.
The boundaries of the retail merchant’s 
system of internal accounting control have not 
changed with the introduction of the EFT system.
The retailer has another means of payment but 
has not extended his system. The boundaries 
of the financial institution’s system have been 
extended to the remote terminal where account­
ing transactions are initiated. Neither the 
financial institution portion nor the terminal 
portion of the system is part of the switch’s 
system of internal accounting control because 
none of the transactions processed through the 
EFT system are recorded on the books of 
record for the switch.
Direct-Deposit/Preauthorized Payment 
Services. As discussed in chapter 1, direct 
deposits and preauthorized payments are 
processed through an automated clearing house 
(ACH). The ACH functions in the clearing 
process by receiving deposits or payments in 
machine-sensible form from a member financial 
institution. The information received is similar 
to the information magnetically encoded on a 
check. The computer at the ACH sorts the 
deposits and payments by bank number and 
forwards them to the appropriate financial 
institution, again in machine-sensible form. The 
function of the ACH is essentially the same as 
the function performed by the Federal Reserve 
System in the clearing of paper checks.
The financial institution’s system of internal 
accounting control begins with the payments 
or deposits received from its customer and ends 
with the sending of machine-sensible deposits 
and payments to the ACH and the recording 
of the transaction in the books of record 
(including the amount due to or due from 
the ACH).
The customer’s system of internal accounting 
control ends when deposits or payments in 
machine-sensible form are sent to the financial 
institution and the transaction has been 
recorded in the customer’s books of record.
For both direct-deposit and preauthorized 
payment transactions, the EFT system does not 
change the extent of any client’s system; rather, 
it provides a new mode of payment or deposit. 
In essence, a business entity presenting 
machine-sensible deposit or payment transac­
tions to its financial institution is effecting an 
exchange of assets between itself and the 
financial institution. For example, a local utility 
company could collect cash or checks over the 
counter and transmit those payments to its 
financial institution as a deposit. Similarily, the 
utility company could present its financial 
institution with a file of machine-sensible pre­
authorized payment transactions which are, in 
effect, the same payments in a form other than 
cash or checks. The deposit is the same, 
regardless of the form.
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The above discussion has described the 
most common activities and transactions 
involved in EFT systems today. Clearly,as EFT 
technology evolves, the auditor will need to 
consider the functions performed by the EFT
system in which the client participates. These 
functions will determine the extent of the client’s 
system and, thus, the nature and extent of the 
auditor’s review.
Controls in EFT Systems
Although the objectives and essential charac­
teristics of accounting control do not change 
with the method of data processing, the 
organization and control procedures used in 
EFT systems may differ from those used in 
manual systems or less complex EDP systems.
According to SAS no. 3, the two basic types 
of EDP accounting control procedures are
(1) general controls, which relate to all EDP 
activities and (2) application controls, which 
relate to specific accounting tasks. The AICPA 
audit and accounting guide, The A u d ito r ’s S tudy  
a n d  E va lua tion  o f In te rna l C on tro l in EDP  
System s (1977) relates to batch-oriented 
systems and discusses these two control 
categories, listing basic controls. The guide 
provides an explanation of the purpose of each 
control, suggests audit procedures and com­
pliance tests, and discusses the possible audit 
effects of a weakness in each control area. 
Although many of the control objectives and 
techniques are applicable to EFT systems, this 
chapter does not repeat that discussion. Rather, 
this chapter covers
1. Aspects of the controls that differ between 
batch-oriented systems and EFT systems.
2. Controls that change in significance in EFT 
systems.
3. New control elements not included in the 
audit and accounting guide.
General Controls. The guide classifies 
general controls as follows:
1. Organization and operation controls
2. Systems development and documentation 
controls
3. Hardware and systems software controls
4. Access controls
5. Data and procedural controls
O rga n iza tion  a n d  O pera tion  C ontro ls. The 
controls in this category involve (1) segregation 
of functions between the EDP department and 
users, (2) provision for general authorization 
over the execution of transactions (for example, 
prohibiting the EDP department from initiating 
or authorizing transactions), and (3) segregation
of functions within the EDP department. These 
controls have greater significance in an EFTS 
environment because the output of transactions 
is often cash or the distribution of goods or 
services.
Plastic cards and PIN numbers should not 
be issued by computer programmers or 
operators. Programmers and operators may 
be able to use their knowledge of the system to 
circumvent control procedures or programmed 
controls. Similarly, POS system personnel who 
are responsible for assisting merchants with 
authorization when the merchants’ terminals are 
inoperative should not be computer pro­
grammers or operators.
Because of the sensitive nature of the 
information in an EFT system, segregation of 
functions should also be considered in systems 
development. Control is enhanced if no one 
individual has a complete, detailed knowledge 
of and access to an entire EFT application.
System s D e ve lo p m e n t a n d  D ocum en ta tion  
C ontro ls. These general controls relate to 
(1) the review, test, and approval of new sys­
tems, (2) control over program changes, and 
(3) documentation procedures. Areas of par­
ticular importance in EFT systems include—
•  Testing of new financial institution interfaces 
(for example, between the bank and the 
switch).
•  Testing of new terminal interfaces to the 
switch.
•  Testing of new application features at the 
switch that impact internal processing at the 
financial institution (that is, new transactions 
that require new control procedures).
In addition, there is an even greater need to 
monitor and control program changes in EFT 
systems.
H ardw are  a n d  System s Softw are C ontro ls.
The control features inherent in the computer 
hardware, operating system, and other sup­
porting software should be used to the maximum 
possible extent to provide control over opera­
tions and to detect and report hardware mal-
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functions.12 This control category has increased 
importance in systems involving data commu­
nications. Transmission error detection methods 
between financial institutions and remote 
terminals should be employed. In addition, 
transmission should include time and date 
coding, transaction sequence numbers, 
employee identification codes, and terminal 
and merchant authorization codes, if applicable.
Access Controls. Access controls provide 
safeguards over the use of documentation, data 
files and programs, and the computer hardware 
itself. Access limitations are important, not only 
to prevent unauthorized transactions, but also 
to meet privacy requirements. Customer account 
numbers, account balances, and account 
relationships should not be made available to 
merchants or other third parties, except as 
provided by law. Controls should be established 
to prevent one financial institution from access­
ing another’s data, or one user from accessing 
another user’s data.
Distribution and handling of plastic cards 
should be carefully controlled. User cards 
should be mailed only to existing customers. 
Supplies of blank cards and equipment used 
to personalize cards should be guarded and 
subject to restricted access. In systems where 
institutions share terminals, cards for all member 
institutions must be accepted by the same units. 
The card construction therefore should be 
nearly identical. Accordingly, each member 
institution should agree to procedures to 
exercise proper control over the manufacture, 
storage, and distribution of the cards.
Another consideration is access to the 
system through the use of unauthorized equip­
ment. For example, telephone lines are the 
usual communication link between on-line 
remote-banking terminals and the financial 
institution’s data processing facility; however, 
telephone lines are susceptible to wire taps. 
The system could be protected by disguising 
transmissions between the terminal and CPU 
and by positive identification of the transmitting 
terminal. The National Bureau of Standards and 
various terminal vendors have devised encryp­
tion algorithms. Such codes require a significant 
amount of time to decipher, unless an appro­
priate decoder is used. Positive terminal 
identification can be accomplished by the use 
of answerback code transmission.
Access control over both the PIN encoding 
algorithms and tables and the communication 
line encryption algorithms should be strictly
enforced. They should be confidential, and, if 
possible, changed frequently.
Although physical security practices vary, 
many terminals are unguarded twenty-four hours 
a day. Accordingly, the units should be strong 
and secure enough to prevent physical penetra­
tion. Federal regulatory authorities have 
prescribed specific minimum physical 
standards for remote-banking terminals.
POS terminals, which are smaller and more 
portable than remote-banking terminals, require 
different security systems. In addition to other 
controls, physical access to POS devices should 
be controlled. When a POS terminal is installed 
in a store, the financial institution should 
establish procedures and training programs to 
make the merchant aware of the minimum 
security standards required by the financial 
institution.
Data and Procedural Controls. Controls to 
ensure prompt and accurate processing include 
(1) a control or balancing function, (2) written 
manuals in support of systems and procedures, 
and (3) capability to restore or replace lost, 
damaged, or incorrect files.13
Because the direct output of many EFTS 
applications includes disbursement of cash and 
payment for merchandise, a control group that is 
organizationally independent of EDP operations, 
systems, or programming is essential. The 
control group should be responsible for per­
forming many of the application controls 
discussed below.
In shared EFT systems, an agreement 
between the concerned parties should'be written 
before the system is implemented. This agree­
ment should outline security and maintenance 
procedures, transaction fees (if applicable), 
liability in case of damage or errors or irregular­
ities, and procedures for termination of the 
agreement. Institutions sharing remote-banking 
terminals should agree to the physical security 
over the units. The members should share 
responsibility for the safety and security of the 
units unless the system provides that the 
members own the terminals separately. In that 
case, each institution should assure the others 
that the terminals are properly maintained.
Capability to restore or replace lost, 
damaged, or incorrect files gains importance in 
EFT systems because the nature of the applica­
tion increases exposure, and the real-time 
environment makes recovery more complex. 
Recovery procedures provide a means of 
reproducing paperless transactions in the event
12 The Auditor's Study and Evaluation of Internal Control in EDP Systems (New York: AICPA, 1977), p. 37.
13 The Auditor’s Study and Evaluation of Internal Control in EDP Systems, p. 43.
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of equipment malfunction. Backup and restart 
procedures should minimize downtime and 
maintain the integrity of data while the system is 
down. In addition, manual procedures to 
originate transactions during periods of 
equipment downtime should be specified.
For example, an off-line remote-banking 
terminal’s transaction file initially stands alone 
as the source document for a transaction. Were 
a terminal to malfunction while in use, the 
transaction occurring could be difficult to 
reconstruct. Therefore, two recording systems 
(hard copy and magnetic or paper tape) should 
be built into each off-line terminal. If one system 
should fail, the other would maintain the audit 
trail. A disadvantage of off-line terminals is the 
requisite daily removal and processing of the 
terminal’s transaction file. Security should be 
maintained when the records are removed from
the terminal and transported to the central 
computer facility. Alteration of these records 
before they are input into the central system 
would be difficult to detect.
For on-line terminals, transaction logs should 
be maintained both at the main computer and 
at the terminal. The main computer file would 
serve as the original record of the transaction 
and the terminal file would serve as support. The 
file should be organized by terminal code and 
list account numbers and amounts without 
revealing PIN numbers or other identification 
codes. If an unusual transaction is detected or 
otherwise selected for testing, the transaction 
can be traced to the terminal from which it 
originated and compared to the terminal file. 
Any discrepancy would indicate that an un­
authorized entry into the EFT system may 
have occurred.
Physical Security
Physical security over the host computer should 
be effective because a catastrophe involving 
an EFT system would be more difficult to recover 
from than a similar disaster in a less compre­
hensive system. Emergency plans and backup 
should exist and be periodically tested.
Procedures should be established to assure 
that no one outside of the maintenance staff
attempts to repair a malfunctioning terminal. 
Instructions about whom to contact in case of 
malfunction should be displayed prominently on 
each terminal. Unauthorized repair of a damaged 
terminal may destroy the reliability of the audit 
trail. Backup systems should be developed for 
the period when processing is interrupted or 
when units are undergoing regular maintenance.
Application Controls
Application controls relate to specific 
accounting tasks. SAS no. 3 categorizes 
application controls as—
•  Input controls
•  Processing controls
•  Ouput controls
Input Controls
Input controls are designed to provide reasonable 
assurance that data received for processing by 
EDP have been properly authorized, converted 
into machine-sensible form and identified, and 
that data (including data transmitted over com­
munication lines) have not been lost, suppressed, 
added [to], duplicated, or otherwise improperly 
changed. Input controls include controls that 
relate to rejection, correction, and resubmission 
of data that were initially incorrect.14
The input controls listed in the audit and 
accounting guide include (1) authorized input,
(2) code verification and input conversion,
(3) data movement, and (4) error handling.
Authorized Input. In an EFTS environment, 
many people may have access to the system. 
Where applicable, input controls should ensure 
that a valid card was used by the valid card­
holder from a terminal authorized to perform 
that transaction.
For example, one common method of user 
identification is the use of a magnetic-striped 
card combined with a unique PIN number 
known only to the user. (Other more advanced 
identification methods such as finger- or voice- 
print analysis are presently not cost effective.) 
To operate the terminal, the user inserts a card 
and enters the PIN number on the terminal’s
14 SAS no. 3, in Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 321.08a.
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keyboard. If the user is unable to enter the PIN 
number correctly or if the terminal recognizes 
the card as being invalid (stolen, counterfeit) 
the user cannot enter the system. Some systems 
do not return the invalid card but store it within 
the terminal until removed by an authorized 
individual. To help assure that an invalid user 
will not obtain both the card and PIN number, 
they should be mailed to the user separately.
An on-line terminal has direct access to the 
central computer file of invalid cards while an 
off-line terminal should maintain its own file for 
such cards. Off-line files will not be as current 
and may require larger terminal storage 
capability than on-line terminals.
While the cost of a card-PIN system is less 
than other systems, physical security may not 
be as good as some alternative system. Cus­
tomers frequently write their PIN number on the 
card or give the number to other customers. 
Coded messages on a plastic card’s magnetic 
stripe can be duplicated. In some systems, 
a PIN number or portion of a PIN number can 
be obtained by observing the user entering the 
number at the terminal.
Several methods exist to make cards more 
secure. Most involve machine-sensible mes­
sages encased within a plastic card, or use of 
radioactive isotopes. Each card should contain 
a unique random factor so that no two would be 
alike. Another method to discourage counterfeits 
is the use of heat- or pressure-sensitive plastic, 
causing the card to be damaged by conven­
tional duplicating techniques.
Another control to help assure authorized 
input is to restrict the types of transactions that 
can be made from certain terminals (for 
example, restrict the terminals from which 
adjustments may be made or high-value 
transactions may be initiated). A terminal that 
handles customer deposits and withdrawals 
should not be capable of obtaining information 
or accessing files other than those necessary to 
complete the specified transactions. The 
system can identify the terminal by use of an 
“answerback” feature.
Code Verification and Input Conversion. Data 
entry errors and the loss or dropping of data can 
be a major source of error in EFT systems. The 
system should be designed to verify each 
transaction before acceptance by the system. 
The user could then eliminate mistakes before 
the transaction is entered into the files. This 
edit/validation process of input transactions 
should involve validation of the transaction 
content, formatting of data, and writing a log 
record including the transaction serial number.
The log should also maintain the date and time 
of the transaction. Further, it would be desirable 
to maintain control totals for each terminal by 
transaction type.
Data Movement. Assurance should be given 
that data are not lost, suppressed, added to, 
duplicated, or otherwise altered. In an on-line 
environment involving data communications 
networks, this is much more complex than in a 
batch environment. The auditor should consider 
evaluating the controls related to message 
transmission and data security. The auditor 
should determine that a satisfactory technique 
is used to validate the receipt and transmission 
of messages (transactions) originating through 
the terminal. A transaction identifier should 
include not only the terminal device identifica­
tion but also other control information such as 
message type indicator (that is, debit, credit, 
high-value debit), message sequence number 
generated at the terminal, designation or 
routing indicator(s), and character count. The 
message sequence number can be used to 
trace the transaction along the complete data 
stream and, if necessary, back to the originating 
station and person. The system should also be 
designed to respond to the terminal device 
acknowledging receipt of the message. If there 
is a problem with validation of the message 
header or transaction, the computer system 
should request retransmission using the same 
sequence number.
Error Handling. The correction of errors and 
resubmission of the corrected transactions 
should be controlled. The errors should be 
corrected either by the person who caused them 
(for example, reentering a transaction that was 
improperly input at the terminal) or by an 
independent third party who reviews them with 
the originator. Terminals from which error 
correction transactions can be made should be 
limited in number and subject to strict access 
controls.
Processing Controls. Processing controls are 
designed to provide reasonable assurance that 
electronic data processing has been performed 
as intended for the particular application, that 
is, that all transactions are processed as 
authorized, that no authorized transactions are 
omitted, and that no unauthorized transactions 
are added.15 Controls in this category include 
use of control totals, limit and reasonableness 
checks, and run-to-run controls.
The following are examples of some process­
ing controls in an EFTS environment:
15 SAS no. 3, in Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 321.08b.
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•  Comparison of daily batch totals from the 
main computer to corresponding totals main­
tained by the terminal device and/or switch.
•  Balancing by account of terminal and/or 
switch transactions for total dollar amount and 
number of items.
•  Monitoring activity logs to identify unusual 
transactions. The monitoring may include 
establishing limits based upon the number 
and dollar amount of transactions. These 
limits may be monitored by terminal, type of 
merchant, and financial institution. The 
objective is to identify potential errors or 
irregularities as they occur.
Output Controls. Output controls are 
designed (1) to assure the accuracy of the 
processing result and (2) to assure that only 
authorized persons receive the output.16
Accuracy of Processing Results. During the 
processing of EFTS transactions, it may be 
desirable to save the master file’s “ before” and 
“after” processing image on a log. Control totals 
over selected data elements could be devel­
oped and the “ before” totals compared with the 
“after” and “transaction” totals.
The customer or user of the terminal can 
serve a valuable control function. Customers 
should be given printed evidence of the transac­
tion when it is complete. They should also be 
given periodic statements and have the 
opportunity to challenge the charges recorded. 
Mailing of the statements, and handling and 
investigation of customer inquiries should be 
performed by the control group or other function 
that is independent of the processing of EFTS 
transactions.
Distribution Controls. Because the direct 
output of an EFT system can be cash or the 
distribution of goods or services, output control 
over these applications is essential. Control over 
output of information from EFTS files is also 
important because of the sensitive nature of the 
information and the privacy regulations 
governing its distribution. One example of this 
type of control would be to limit customer 
information inquiries, based upon the terminal 
and person performing the inquiry.
Study and Evaluation of Internal Control 
in EFT Systems
Once the auditor has determined the extent 
of the client’s system, the auditor has a respon­
sibility to obtain an understanding of the flow of 
transactions through the system, the extent to 
which EDP is used in each significant account­
ing application, and the basic structure of 
accounting control within that system.
In many EFT systems, third parties are 
responsible for some portion of the processing 
of transactions. For example, the third party may 
provide the switching data center, the tele­
communications network, the terminals, or all of 
the foregoing. To the extent that the client’s 
system of accounting control includes process­
ing performed by a third party, the auditor 
should consider this processing during the 
preliminary phase of the review. SAS no. 3 
indicates—
When EDP is used in significant accounting 
applications, the auditor should consider the EDP 
activity in his review and evaluation of accounting 
control. This is true whether the use of EDP in
accounting applications is limited or extensive and 
whether the EDP facilities are operated under the 
direction of the auditor's client or a third party.17
There are two types of switches used in 
remote-banking and point-of-sale services. They 
are referred to here as “message-passing” and 
“ bank” switches. A message-passing switch 
performs only straightforward data communica­
tions between the financial institution and the 
terminals. A bank switch can route transactions 
between financial institutions and may provide 
some control or accounting functions. Both 
types of switches are within the financial institu­
tion’s system.
Because of the limited function performed by 
message-passing switches, the auditor’s review 
of the switch will normally be concerned only 
with (1) determining which type of switch it is 
and (2) reviewing the financial institution’s 
controls to ensure that the switch only transmits 
the data and does not alter it.
16 SAS no. 3, in Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 321.08c.
17 SAS no. 3, in Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 321.03.
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The auditor’s review of bank switches, 
however, would be based on the functions 
they perform. As indicated above, a bank switch
Summary
This chapter has discussed two problems facing 
the auditor of EFT systems:
•  How much of the EFT system linking many 
organizations is included in the client’s 
system? What parts of the system should the 
auditor consider in the study and evaluation 
of internal control?
•  What controls have increased importance in 
EFT systems? How can certain control 
objectives listed in the audit guide18 be met 
in EFT systems?
This discussion is the task force’s initial 
assessment of these questions. Further research 
and professional deliberation will be needed as 
auditors gain experience with these systems.
18 The Auditor’s Study and Evaluation of Internal Control in EDP Systems.
owned by a third party should be considered 
a service center.
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